Nuclear independence – an illusion?
Technology transfer is often presented as a shortcut to technological capability. In strategic sectors, it rarely is. Nowhere is this more evident than in nuclear energy, where dependence extends well beyond the initial technology package to control over design, spares, hardware and software upgrades and the right to modify systems throughout a reactor's lifecycle.
India must view the recent US opening on nuclear technology in this context. In late 2025, the US authorised three American companies – Clean Core Thorium Energy, Holtec International and Flowserve Corporation – to transfer nuclear technology to India under 10 CFR Part 810. This was followed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio's visit to New Delhi in May 2026 for nuclear talks and a US Nuclear Executive Mission.
For a relationship once defined by nuclear denial and technology restrictions, the shift is significant. But unless collaboration builds manufacturing depth, design capability and lifecycle autonomy, technology transfer may simply replace old denial with new dependence.
How control persists after technology transfer: South Korea's experience illustrates the limits of technology transfer. Although it spent decades developing the APR1400 reactor, Westinghouse argued that the design remained derived from technology licensed from its System 80+ reactor and therefore could not be exported without US authorisation under 10 CFR Part 810. The dispute, settled in January 2025 with Westinghouse retaining a role in future exports, showed that even extensive domestic capability does not guarantee freedom to use, modify or export technology independently.
Control persists through three interconnected layers. The first is the 48-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which regulates exports of nuclear materials, equipment and dual-use technologies. Its guidelines require supplier-state authorisation before exporting trigger-list items, including reactor pressure vessels, enrichment and reprocessing equipment.
The second layer is domestic export-control law. In the US, 10 CFR Part 810 requires Department of Energy approval before American nuclear technology can be transferred abroad. It extends to licensees and subsidiaries, meaning recipients developing reactor designs from licensed technology may still face restrictions on further transfer. Authorisations can also be suspended or revoked if deemed contrary to US interests.
The third layer is intellectual property. Nuclear technology is rarely transferred as a complete package. While some components are patented, critical know-how often remains protected as trade secrets that patent licences do not automatically transfer.
The greatest risk is invisible. A recipient country knows what it has received but not necessarily what has been withheld. A reactor may operate for years before independent maintenance or modification depends on know-how that was never transferred.
Why this matters for India: Under the Nuclear Energy Mission in Union Budget 2025-26, as much as Rs20,000 crore has been allocated for SMR R&D, with at least five indigenously designed reactors targeted by 2033. Against this objective, the terms on which Indian firms access foreign reactor technology become especially important.
The Holtec arrangement with Larsen & Toubro, Tata Consulting Engineers and Holtec Asia illustrates the challenge. The US Department of Energy has authorised Holtec to share SMR-300 technical information with these entities for 10 years, subject to a five-year review. The information cannot be shared with third parties, including other Indian entities, without US approval. Manufacturing may occur in India, but the intellectual property remains with Holtec under US export controls. If the authorisation expires or is revoked, drawings, tooling and related equipment may also have to be returned.
Such arrangements may appear workable during periods of close India-US relations. But strategic sectors cannot rely solely on favourable diplomacy. Governments change, export-control priorities shift, and bilateral relations evolve. India must assess whether these partnerships enable firms to maintain, modify, upgrade and scale technologies independently or simply localise production while control remains abroad.
The way forward: The case for expanding nuclear power is compelling. India needs reliable, clean and large-scale energy. But the terms of expansion matter. Technology transfer may help India add reactors but not necessarily build a truly independent nuclear industry.
The SHANTI Act, 2025, allows private Indian entities to hold patents for nuclear inventions, creating a legal foundation for a more ambitious approach. But legal permission alone will not create technological sovereignty. India's nuclear expertise remains concentrated within BARC, NPCIL and the Department of Atomic Energy, limiting private-sector innovation.
Genuine indigenisation will require a deliberate policy shift. The government must create mechanisms to share knowledge from public institutions with Indian firms while preserving safety and security. This should be supported through PLI-style incentives, procurement preferences, assured demand for domestic suppliers and public investment in testing and certification.
Foreign technology transfer may contribute to India's nuclear future. But it cannot be the foundation of India's nuclear independence.
Chandy is research associate, Pahle India Foundation, while Gupta is associate fellow, Pahle India Foundation