Wooing Indian capital
Illustration: Panju Ganguli

Wooing Indian capital

Wooing Indian capital
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US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s three-day visit to Mumbai and Jamnagar is significant in more ways than one. It came amid the turbulence in India’s relations with the US that has resulted from President Donald Trump’s unpredictability. The very fact that Rubio decided to come to Mumbai instead of New Delhi underlined its importance as the financial capital of India. Rubio’s interaction with the Tatas and the Adanis in Mumbai and his talks with Mukesh Ambani in Jamnagar also highlight the growing connection between Indian capital and the nation’s foreign policy. As Indian companies acquire greater economic weight and wider global reach, they are becoming an important part of India’s diplomatic arsenal, as in other large developed nations.

The visit was mostly economic, evident from the questions he took on the long-pending trade deal, exuding optimism that it is almost done. On H1-B visas, Rubio said that the US is overhauling its immigration system. Once that is done and the logic of market forces asserts itself, it is reasonable to expect Indian talent to fare better than most. Hinting at a more strategic energy collaboration between India and the US that goes beyond Indian purchases of American hydrocarbons, he visited Reliance’s facility at Jamnagar, the world’s largest oil refinery, where he was hosted by Mukesh Ambani. Reliance, which now buys Venezuelan crude under a US licence, is set to become a crucial node in the US-India energy alliance.

Although Rubio explained his trip as a measure to strengthen bilateral trade ties, the thrust of the trip seemed more focused on American domestic politics, a search for mid-term talking points by courting new buyers and markets for expanded Venezuelan oil production. This is despite the opaque finances of the entire Venezuelan affair, as it has been widely reported that there has been no public accounting of just where Venezuelan oil profits are going.

Rubio is both Secretary of State and National Security Adviser, a powerful combination last seen under Henry Kissinger in the 1970s. As a senator, Rubio has long favoured closer ties with India. He is a possible Republican presidential candidate in 2028. India’s political investment in the engagement with Rubio is a prudent bet for the long-term relationship with the US, provided the Democrats do not upset the Republican applecart.

For Delhi, Rubio’s persona matters. It is hoped that Rubio’s visit has prepared the ground for rebooting relations in the remaining two years of Trump’s term. That is the reason why Jaishankar, our foreign minister, flew to Mumbai to meet Rubio and the government did not take offence at the US secretary of state not calling on Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi. Critics, and there are many in Delhi now, fear that Trump could still reverse course on tariffs over Russian oil purchases and throw a last-minute spanner in the trade deal. For the near term, however, Rubio has sent positive signals. The Modi government sees room to narrow differences on the issue as Trump seeks to recalibrate relations with Russia and change the earlier course on Ukraine.

Rubio also hinted at a possible Quad meeting on the margins of the East Asia Summit in November and spoke of the work underway at the ministerial level. He refused to be drawn into a discussion on the current protests in India, arguing that they are an internal matter. Clearly, the Trump administration does not want to rile Delhi on issues like human rights and democratic outpourings.

India, on its part, did not push any issue like H-1B visas, knowing that its own visa policy is highly restrictive; its political class is locked in a harsh public debate on foreign migrants. The government in Delhi has sensibly dissociated itself from the H-1B debate, which is an issue between US companies looking for foreign talent and the MAGA movement leading the backlash.

On Pakistan, it is somewhat unfortunate that an issue is being made of its ties with the US. India cannot claim the right to good relations with US adversaries like Iran and object, when Washington does the same with Islamabad. Those familiar with the history of India-US ties will point out that the biggest advances in US-India ties, including the civil nuclear deal, came in the 2000s, when Washington had a close military partnership with General Musharraf’s Pakistan. India’s relations with the US must be built on its own merits rather than in hyphenation with Pakistan. There is more than enough common ground to do that. India needs greater self-assurance in engaging the US.