As 3.3 GW of solar capacity sits idle, a critical question emerges: Who is accountable when the grid fails to evacuate the power India’s clean energy projects are built to generate? We need to take a leaf from global best practice.
India added nearly 45 GW of renewable energy capacity in 2025, achieving a historic milestone by reaching 50 per cent non-fossil fuel power generation 5 years ahead of schedule. The country now stands fourth globally in renewable energy installed capacity, a testament to its aggressive clean energy push. Yet beneath this success story lies a troubling paradox: as the nation races to build solar and wind farms, its grid infrastructure is struggling to absorb the very power these projects generate.
High-renewable states, including Gujarat, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu, are reporting curtailment levels ranging from 10 per cent to 30 per cent during peak solar generation hours. But nowhere is the crisis more acute than in Rajasthan, with curtailment spiking to 51.5 per cent and more than 4 GW of renewable capacity currently facing curtailment, causing developer losses of approximately R250 crore. Fully commissioned renewable projects are facing near-complete shutdown during peak solar hours – precisely when these plants are designed to generate maximum power.
The story begins with a promise that went unfulfilled. Industry representatives had been assured that the commissioning of two massive 765 kV transmission corridors – Khetri-Narela and Bhadla II-Sikar II – would substantially reduce the severe curtailment being experienced by renewable energy projects operating under Temporary General Network Access (T-GNA) in Rajasthan. Developers operating under T-GNA had been facing 55 per cent curtailment during peak hours, a painful but arguably manageable constraint that at least allowed partial revenue generation.
Then came the disappointment. When the Khetri-Narela line went live in December 2025, followed by Bhadla II-Sikar II in January 2026, operational data revealed a shocking reality: despite their combined design capacity of approximately 8,000 MW, the two corridors together added only about 2,000 MW of incremental usable transmission margin under prevailing operating criteria. Against this modest increase, over 4,500 MW of General Network Access (GNA) – more than double the available margin – was operationalised around the same time. The entire incremental capacity was absorbed by projects graduating from temporary to permanent access status, leaving T-GNA projects worse off than before.
Today, Rajasthan has approximately 23 GW of commissioned renewable energy capacity. The available evacuation margin stands at 18.9 GW. The arithmetic is simple but devastating: about 4 GW of generation capacity has nowhere to go. During peak solar hours between 11 am and 2 pm, 26 commissioned projects with a combined capacity of 3,287 MW under T-GNA are experiencing 100 per cent curtailment. They can inject power only during off-peak periods, and even then in a staggered manner that makes revenue projections nearly impossible.
The accountability vacuum
The dramatic gap between planned and operational transmission capacity exposes a fundamental structural flaw in India’s power sector: a disconnect between those who plan the grid and those who operate it. The Central Transmission Utility (CTU) is responsible for planning transmission infrastructure and granting connectivity approvals. Based on CTU’s plans, developers invest thousands of crores and commission projects in good faith. But when transmission lines go live, it is Grid India – the system operator managing real-time grid operations – that determines how much power can actually flow through those lines.
This separation of planning and operations has created an accountability vacuum. CTU planned two corridors with combined design capacity of approximately 8,000 MW and allocated General Network Access accordingly. Developers committed capital based on these connectivity approvals. But when physical infrastructure commissioned for 8,000 MW operationally delivers only 2,000 MW under Grid India’s real-time security protocols, who bears responsibility? Currently, the answer is unambiguous: developers alone.
Grid India faces no formal performance pressure around asset utilisation. The organisation is rightly entrusted with maintaining grid security, and stability is paramount. But when stability becomes the sole performance metric, excessive conservatism becomes the natural default.
There are no published benchmarks for how efficiently transmission assets should be utilised within safe operational limits. There is no automatic review trigger when major corridors consistently operate at 12-15 per cent of design capability. There is no requirement for Grid India to publicly explain why assets commissioned for 8,000 MW transfer operationally permit only 2,000 MW.
“When you commission two 765 kV corridors for thousands of crores and extract only 12-13 per cent of their combined capability, you need to ask whether you are being safe or simply conservative,” notes Dhanendra Kumar, former CCI Chairperson. “Modern grid management tools exist precisely to navigate this tension. The global experience shows you can operate grids with high renewable penetration while maintaining reliability, but it requires operational sophistication, not just physical infrastructure.”
Contrast this with international practice. Australia’s Energy Market Operator (AEMO) publishes detailed engineering assessments that explicitly distinguish between design capacity and usable operational capacity under various contingency conditions. Their 25-year Integrated System Plan does not just list what infrastructure will be built: it specifies what the system can actually deliver under realistic operating constraints, accounting for system-strength requirements and stability limits at specific locations. This transparency allows generators and investors to understand true evacuation capability, not just nameplate ratings.
In Germany, transmission operators update their Network Development Plan every 2 years with explicit 10–15-year planning horizons. The plan begins with a ‘scenario framework’ that outlines probable energy system evolution, undergoes public consultation, and receives formal approval from the Federal Network Agency before detailed planning begins. This ensures transmission planning rests on publicly vetted assumptions rather than opaque projections. When planned capacity does not materialise as expected, there is institutional accountability and transparent course correction.
India has neither requirement. Generators receive no credible advance estimate of how much actual usable margin each new transmission line will provide when commissioned. System operators face no obligation to publish corridor-wise utilisation data or explain persistent under-utilisation. Meanwhile, transmission companies recover full regulated returns regardless of whether their assets deliver usable capacity. The consequence is predictable: renewable developers bear 100 per cent of commercial risk while facing an opaque system that provides no visibility into when, or whether, planned transmission capacity will translate into actual evacuation capability.
“What Rajasthan exposes is an accountability vacuum in India’s power sector,” observes Shriram Subramanian, Founder, InGovern Research. “Transmission companies recover their full regulated returns regardless of whether their assets deliver usable capacity. Grid operators face no performance pressure around utilisation. Meanwhile, renewable developers bear 100 per cent of the commercial risk if the system does not work as planned. That’s a policy failure, not just a technical challenge.”
The access hierarchy
To understand how this crisis unfolded, one must grasp the distinction between Permanent GNA and Temporary GNA – categories that were meant to bridge the inevitable lag between generation and transmission infrastructure but have instead created a rigid hierarchy that concentrates risk on one set of players.
General Network Access defines how much power the interstate transmission system commits to evacuate for a generator. Permanent GNA is granted once designated transmission infrastructure is completed, giving these projects priority access to the grid. Until transmission systems are ready, projects operate under Temporary GNA, using whatever spare capacity remains after permanent commitments are met.
For several years, this arrangement worked reasonably well. After serving Permanent GNA holders, the grid retained operational margin for Temporary GNA users, who could evacuate 40-50 per cent of their generation during peak hours. Revenues were lower, but projects remained viable.
Rajasthan’s current predicament marks a sharp departure from this equilibrium. Most of the 3,287 MW now facing total curtailment actually fall within their notified connectivity start dates. These projects were commissioned on time, built in response to explicit policy signals, and are being penalised not for any failing on their part but due to delays in commissioning their Associated Transmission Systems (ATS). They are forced to operate under T-GNA through no fault of their own.
The developers affected – including major players such as Adani, ReNew, Serentica, Juniper, ACME and AMP – represent an investment of approximately R15,000 crore now exposed to sustained revenue loss. When evacuation drops suddenly, revenues vanish but fixed costs persist – loan repayments, operation and maintenance expenses, and contractual commitments continue regardless of whether a single unit of electricity can be sold.
The technical constraints
The low utilisation of the Khetri-Narela and Bhadla II-Sikar II lines – and the broader curtailment crisis – stems from a combination of grid stability issues that have proven harder to resolve than anticipated. At a 15 December 2025 meeting chaired by the Chairman of the Central Electricity Authority, system operators identified several limiting constraints in evacuating renewable energy from Rajasthan.
The primary issue is persistent voltage oscillations in renewable energy complexes. The Northern Regional Load Despatch Centre and National Load Despatch Centre have observed high-frequency, high-amplitude voltage oscillations ranging from 60-80 kV at various pooling stations. These oscillations, while temporarily dampened by operating STATCOMs (Static Synchronous Compensators) in manual fixed-Q mode rather than automatic mode, indicate underlying system stability concerns.
A committee comprising NRLDC, NLDC, PGCIL, CTU, Rajasthan SLDC and Siemens was formed to investigate STATCOM performance issues. Meeting on 9 July 2025, the committee identified 15 renewable energy plants contributing to oscillations and noted that high-frequency, low-amplitude oscillations at some RE substations were being amplified by STATCOMs at Bhadla 2 and Fatehgarh 2, requiring fine-tuning.
Additional constraints include low short-circuit ratios at various pooling stations, loading constraints on the Bhadla (RVPN) to Bikaner (RVPN) 400 kV double-circuit line, and high line loading of the 765 kV Bikaner-Khetri double-circuit line.
There is a legitimate technical basis for operational caution. India’s grid has experienced major disturbances in the past, and system operators rightly prioritise stability. Spain’s experience offers a cautionary tale: on 28 April 2025, the entire Iberian grid collapsed within minutes when a voltage surge from 400 to 435 kilovolts triggered a cascade of generator disconnections. Solar provided 59 per cent and wind 12 per cent of generation at the time – levels the system had previously managed. Investigations revealed that conventional generators failed to provide adequate voltage control and, critically, that allowing inverter-based renewable resources to regulate voltage could have prevented the outage.
Following Spain’s blackout, renewable curtailment spiked to 11 per cent in July 2025 as operators adopted conservative practices. The lesson for India is clear: inadequate voltage infrastructure forces a choice between system collapse and sustained curtailment. But the solution is not limiting renewables – it is modernising voltage control through properly tuned STATCOMs, allowing inverter-based resources to provide voltage regulation, and enforcing reactive power standards.
However, when technical constraints result in 765 kV corridors operating at 12-13 per cent utilisation – delivering only 2,000 MW combined against a design capacity of 8,000 MW – questions arise about whether the balance between security and efficiency has tilted too far towards conservatism. More sophisticated grid management approaches exist that can maintain security while extracting greater value from infrastructure investments.
Modern grid operations
Globally, system operators have moved beyond static N-1 contingency frameworks that maintain large safety margins through preventive curtailment. Advanced grids use dynamic security assessment, real-time monitoring and adaptive protection to safely push higher power flows through existing assets while maintaining reliability.
Denmark, where renewables supply nearly 90 per cent of electricity, demonstrates that high-RE grids require operational sophistication, not just physical infrastructure. Its transmission operator, Energinet, uses comprehensive ancillary services markets to maintain stability: Frequency Containment Reserve activates within 30 seconds, automatic Frequency Restoration Reserve within five minutes, and manual reserves handle longer imbalances. Denmark publishes long-term ancillary service requirements and keeps markets accessible to diverse participants, ensuring reliability without routinely curtailing clean energy.
The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) has commissioned 12.05 GW of battery storage by Q3 2025 – representing 27 per cent of all operational storage in the United States. Real-time co-optimisation enables batteries to charge during high solar generation and discharge during evening peaks. On 11 September 2025, battery storage discharged 7,741 MW, representing 10.6 per cent of total demand, managing renewable variability without curtailment.
Batteries are deployed near demand centres, not exclusively co-located with generation, capturing peak price spreads while improving grid stability.
These international examples share a common theme: they treat renewables as must-run resources and use operational flexibility – ancillary services, storage integration and dynamic grid management – to accommodate variable generation rather than defaulting to curtailment when challenges arise.
India’s grid operations, by contrast, still largely reflect an earlier era’s philosophy, where maintaining security through large safety margins and conservative operating assumptions was the primary approach. The question is not whether Grid India should prioritise security – it absolutely should. The question is whether current operating protocols extract reasonable value from expensive transmission assets or leave significant capability unused through overly conservative practices.
The capital efficiency question
The dramatic underutilisation of transmission assets raises uncomfortable questions about capital efficiency and institutional accountability in India’s power sector. These lines cost thousands of crores, financed through consumer tariffs and public capital. When massive new assets add minimal usable transfer capacity, the system must explain what is constraining flows and whether full value is being extracted from these investments.
Transmission investments now exceeding Rs1 lakh crore nationally are recovered through tariffs paid by DISCOMs and, ultimately, consumers. If high-voltage corridors systematically underdeliver on usable capacity, the economic efficiency of this entire investment programme comes into question. When these assets fail to deliver commensurate value, it represents a wealth transfer from consumers to underutilised infrastructure without corresponding benefits.
Immediate relief measures
Stakeholders, including the National Solar Energy Federation of India, have proposed several measures that could provide immediate relief without requiring legislative changes or massive new infrastructure such as Special Protection Schemes (SPS). Most curtailment today is driven by N-1 contingency constraints rather than actual real-time loading. An SPS is a real-time dynamic security control that monitors grid parameters and initiates pre-programmed corrective actions to maintain stability. SPS allows transmission corridors to operate closer to their true physical capability by mitigating risks from sudden outages. Instead of pre-emptively curtailing 3.3 GW, SPS can prevent cascading failures by shedding minimal pre-identified generation only when essential.
Until the committee investigating STATCOM performance finalises its report and fine-tunes operations, STATCOMs should continue operating in manual mode to dampen voltage oscillations. During voltage oscillations or overshoot events, curtailment should be targeted – first at RE developers contributing to oscillations, and only then at T-GNA projects, rather than imposing blanket curtailment of all T-GNA capacity.
Another measure is the dynamic reallocation of unused GNA margins. During winter and low-generation periods, GNA margins may not be fully utilised during peak hours by projects whose permanent access has been made effective. The margin available from underutilised GNA should be diverted to T-GNA projects, evaluated using dynamic line rating principles. This real-time reallocation could maximise system utilisation without compromising security.
There is also the question of equitable curtailment distribution: if evacuating the full 23 GW commissioned capacity in Rajasthan is currently impossible, the available 18.9 GW margin should be distributed proportionately among all generators rather than concentrating 100 per cent curtailment on T-GNA projects. This would reduce peak-hour curtailment to approximately 15-18 per cent across the board – an operational inconvenience but not a financial catastrophe for any single set of projects.
Beyond immediate operational fixes, Rajasthan’s crisis exposes deeper institutional weaknesses requiring systemic reforms. Currently, no formal channel exists for generators to ascertain in advance how much additional transmission margin each new line will actually provide in operational terms. Developers plan commissioning schedules based on connectivity approvals and announced transmission timelines, only to discover that infrastructure does not translate into usable evacuation capacity. In the next 6 months, five transmission lines are expected to be commissioned in Rajasthan. The T-GNA margin likely to open after these additions remains unknown. Grid India must provide credible advance estimates of expected usable capacity from forthcoming assets, with regular updates as commissioning approaches.
Grid India is rightly entrusted with maintaining grid security, but when stability becomes the sole performance metric, excessive conservatism becomes the natural default. System operators must also be evaluated on their ability to maximise utilisation of transmission assets within safe operational limits. This requires investment in advanced operational tools, real-time controls and dynamic security assessment capabilities. Establish utilisation benchmarks and automatic review triggers – when major corridors consistently operate below 30 per cent of design capability for more than 6 months, independent technical reviews should be triggered to determine whether constraints are technical, reflect overly conservative operations, or result from delayed complementary investments.
The path forward
Rajasthan’s curtailment crisis is not an isolated anomaly but a warning signal about the sustainability of India’s renewable energy expansion model. The country is betting its energy future on massive capacity additions – targeting 500 GW of non-fossil fuel capacity by 2030.
But if projects that commission on time face devastating curtailment while the system bears no consequences for transmission delays or underperformance, the investment compact underpinning this transition will erode.
The choice is not between grid security and renewable growth. Well-managed grids globally demonstrate that both are achievable simultaneously. The real choice is between unmanaged operational stress that concentrates costs on individual developers and deliberate governance that distributes challenges equitably while driving system-wide improvements.
What Rajasthan particularly exposes is the accountability gap at the heart of India’s grid operations. CTU plans the network, Grid India operates it, transmission companies recover regulated returns regardless of asset performance, and developers bear all commercial consequences when the system underdelivers. This institutional architecture creates perverse incentives: no entity faces meaningful consequences for persistent underutilisation of expensive infrastructure or for the gap between planned and operational capacity.
The solutions – both immediate and structural – are technically feasible and economically sensible. What is needed now is the institutional will to implement them before confidence in India’s renewable energy sector suffers lasting damage. As another 2-3 GW of solar capacity prepares for commissioning in the next few months in Rajasthan, the urgency could not be greater. The question is whether policymakers will act before the crisis deepens further, or whether Rajasthan’s curtailment catastrophe will become the template for India’s renewable-rich states as they struggle to absorb the green power their grids cannot carry.