It was on 12 August 2026, exactly six days before the annual general meeting (AGM) at which shareholders were due to vote on his reappointment as a director, that a letter from N Chandrasekaran reached the board of Tata Sons. He had removed himself from consideration and asked the directors to begin the succession process soon.
“A chairman with a term running to February 2027 could have gone on his own timetable, in his own words, at a moment of his choosing, with nobody watching. Why was that door not used? And when a man with 40 years in a house chooses the loudest exit available to him, what are we meant to conclude – that no quieter one existed, or that a quiet one would not have served?” says Nitin Potdar, an M&A lawyer and founder of the Chambers of Nitin Potdar, in a LinkedIn post, adding: “Forty years in the house, ten in the chair – and a departure conducted in the newspapers.”
For some corporate observers, the question is not about Chandrasekaran, but about the managing directors and chief executives across some 30 listed Tata companies and dozens of unlisted ones. Many have spent 20 or 30 years with the Group, each with an independent board, audit committee, nomination and remuneration committee, and future reappointments to consider. Their employees, lenders and foreign partners all read the newspapers, yet this is how the chapter closes.
The resolution had gone before the Tata Sons board on 24 February 2026. According to Chandrasekaran’s letter, it was not carried because one board member did not support it and, in the absence of unanimous support, he chose to defer the decision. Reports suggest the reservation came from the chairman of the Tata Trusts and was based on weak financial performance and losses at some Group companies.
Tata watchers have raised questions about describing the individual simply as “one of the board members”. If the reservation did indeed come from that quarter, was it merely a procedural hiccup reported six months later, or did it represent the whole story?
Some commentators argue that a director who withholds assent is performing precisely the role for which the position exists. Independent judgement, they note, is the very purpose of appointing independent directors, raising the question of when the exercise of such judgement becomes a grievance worthy of public disclosure.
Referring to the statement that there was an “absence of unanimous support”, others question which provision requires unanimity in such a case. Neither the Companies Act nor, as far as has been shown, the Articles of Association imposes such a requirement. Unanimity, they argue, has traditionally been a courtesy extended to Tata chairmen rather than a legal threshold. The question therefore arises as to who transformed it into such a requirement and, having done so, who is entitled to complain about the veto that was effectively created.
Another question is whether it was Chandrasekaran’s decision to defer the resolution, given that it related to his own reappointment. Should an interested director have been steering that process, or should the remaining directors have reached their decision independently?
Attention has also turned to why, if the decision could be deferred in February, it could not have been brought back before the board in March, April or May. Who kept the matter off the agenda for six months, and why is that individual not identified in the letter?
Referring to the letter’s assertion that strategic projects were at critical stages and that clarity of leadership mattered to employees, investors, partners and other stakeholders, observers ask whether, if that accurately described the risk, it was not equally true in February. They also question whether those concerns were disclosed beyond the boardroom, noting that Chandrasekaran chaired several listed Tata companies, each with its own disclosure obligations once market rumours began to affect share prices. Did those mechanisms function, or did they simply wait for the letter?
Finally, questions have also been raised about the characterisation of the risk itself. If it was not accurate, how should the letter be interpreted? Was a document stating that a board’s decision could delay critical projects, issued by the very person affected by that decision just six days before shareholders were due to vote, simply a disclosure, or an attempt to exert pressure?
The successor
Chandrasekaran’s decision to step down has triggered a succession debate. Does the Tata Group need to look outside the family for its next chairman? Not really. There has to be a process, but the question of who succeeds Chandrasekaran as chairman of Tata Sons is much ado about nothing. Chandrasekaran has decided not to seek another term when his tenure ends in February 2027, but that does not automatically require the Tata Group to look outside the family. With the 69-year-old Noel Tata at the helm, the Group can maintain continuity while placing a proven business leader at its apex.
“Noel’s strongest qualification is not his surname but his record. At Trent, where he became managing director in 1999 and is now chairman, he oversaw the transformation of a fledgling retail operation into one of India’s leading organised retailers. Westside established the Tata fashion-retail proposition, while Zudio became one of the Group’s strongest recent growth stories. Trent’s transformation remains one of Noel’s most notable operating credentials,” says Vivek Suchanti, chairman of Concept Communications.
Noel’s other major operating assignment was Tata International. As managing director from 2010 to 2021, he led the company’s growth from about $500 million in turnover to more than $3 billion. This record establishes him as a leader with experience in building and scaling businesses, rather than a family member whose credentials rest primarily on inheritance.
His Tata experience extends well beyond Trent. Noel chairs Trent, Tata International, Voltas and Tata Investment Corporation, and is vice-chairman of Tata Steel and Titan. His long association with Titan has given him close exposure to another of the Group’s most successful consumer businesses, including its flagship Tanishq franchise.
“That consumer experience is relevant to the Tata Group’s evolution. Tata Consumer Products has become a substantial food and beverages platform, while Titan, Trent, Croma and Tata Play have taken Tata brands into millions of Indian homes. Tata Neu represents the Group’s attempt to connect many of these consumer relationships through a common digital platform,” adds Suchanti.
Air India has brought another historic Tata business back into the Group. Noel did not build all these businesses, and that distinction matters. His strength lies in the breadth of his exposure to them, alongside his own record of building businesses. He brings experience across consumer, international and industrial operations at a time when the Tata portfolio spans all three.
His institutional familiarity is equally significant. Noel has been associated with the Tata Group for more than four decades. Since October 2024, he has chaired Tata Trusts, which collectively hold 66 per cent of Tata Sons. He therefore occupies a position at the intersection of the family, the trusts and the operating companies.
“India’s major family business groups have long demonstrated that professional management and family stewardship need not be alternatives. The Ambanis, Bajajs, Birlas, Godrejs, Jindals, Mittals and Munjals have continued to place capable family members at the top while relying on professional managers to run their businesses,” adds Suchanti.
The Tata Group need not be different simply for the sake of being different. Noel’s credentials are not a matter of pedigree alone. He has built and scaled businesses, operated internationally and served across the Group’s industrial and consumer companies. As chairman of Tata Trusts, he now combines that operating experience with a deep understanding of the institution.
Another twist
Harsh Goenka publicly backed TV Narendran, managing director of Tata Steel, as his choice to succeed N Chandrasekaran at Tata Sons. In a post on X (formerly Twitter), Goenka praised Chandrasekaran’s decade-long leadership and described Narendran as a “proven Tata insider” with “Tata values in his DNA”.
“A fine manager’s innings comes to an end. Chandra led TCS to great heights and steered the Tata Group with a steady hand. A few blemishes – digital business and Air India – but overall, a stellar managerial record. Now begins the succession speculation. My bet: TV Narendran – a proven Tata insider, strong operating track record, respected across the Group, low-key and with Tata values in his DNA,” adds Goenka, who also includes in his list Praveen Sinha, CEO of Tata Power; Shailesh Chandra of Tata Play; Ramakrishnan Mukundan of Tata Chemicals; and Neville and Maya, representing Noel Tata’s next generation.
The road ahead
The next phase for the Tata Group is likely to focus on scale, consolidation, new businesses and global expansion. After nearly a decade of Chandrasekaran’s leadership, the Group once again faces the challenge of succession, having already experienced a difficult transition during the Cyrus Mistry episode. “What would you like the Tata Group to be known for 10 years from now that it is not known for today?” was one of the questions sent to Noel. There was no reply.
Then there is Air India and the Group’s other big bets. Air India is perhaps the most visible symbol of the Tata Group’s return to one of its historic businesses. It involves enormous capital expenditure and a long gestation period. The question is whether this strategic investment is creating long-term value or becoming an excessive drag on the Group. At the same time, the Tata Group is investing heavily in aviation, semiconductors, electronics, digital businesses and other new areas.
Surely the Tata Group now needs to consolidate rather than continue adding new businesses. Tata Sons’ possible listing has also become a major corporate governance and capital markets issue.
A Noel chapter could therefore provide continuity at the top while giving the Group the institutional confidence to pursue its next phase of transformative growth. Hopefully, Noel Tata will be able to bring about changes and put the Group back in shape.
Box
It is interesting to see how the Group has evolved from JRD Tata’s era to that of N Chandrasekaran. Comparisons between the four leaders who have headed the Tata Group over the past 50 years are not entirely fair. Each operated in a different era, under different economic conditions and government policies. The MRTP Act was in force from 1970 to 2016, Wealth Tax from 1957 to 2016, and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA), introduced in 1974, acted as a major disincentive for Indian industrial groups to build assets overseas. Every request involving scarce foreign exchange required Reserve Bank of India approval, and outbound acquisitions were heavily restricted. The Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA), which replaced FERA in 2000, was far more liberal, simplifying the inward and outward movement of funds.
Restrictive period
Even during these restrictive years, the Tata Group continued to grow through both greenfield projects and acquisitions. Takeovers were the preferred route for many industrial houses, including the RPG Group, the Birlas and the Tatas. Reliance was the notable exception, preferring organic growth. Its biggest acquisition came after 2000, when it acquired a 26 per cent stake in IPCL from the government. During JRD Tata’s leadership, the Group’s defining achievements were expansion and diversification.
JRD had the longest tenure, from 1939 to 1991. He was the principal architect of the modern Tata Group, overseeing the growth of Tata Steel and the establishment of Tata Motors (then Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company), Air India, TCS, Titan, Tata Oil, Lakmé and Voltas, among many others. During his tenure, one of India’s earliest open offers was made for the acquisition of Consolidated Coffee, long before SEBI came into existence. Acquisitions in those years were relatively small because capital was scarce, but Voltas and Tata Tea nevertheless expanded through takeovers. Tata Tea itself was acquired during the FERA era, when Sterling companies were being divested; it was then known as Tata Finlay. Tata Mills also expanded during JRD’s tenure before being sold in the 1980s. Tata Oil and its subsidiary Lakmé were later divested to Hindustan Lever in the 1990s.
JRD built the Group from around a dozen companies to nearly 100 by the time he stepped down. Under his leadership, Tata earned a reputation as an ethical and professionally managed business house.
Global footprints
Ratan Tata, who succeeded JRD, is widely credited with taking the Group global. The transformation began with the acquisition of Tetley for £270 million. Tata Tea (now Tata Consumer Products) was among the earliest Indian companies to pay a premium for global brands, later adding Eight O’Clock Coffee, Good Earth and teapigs. Today, Tata Consumer Products commands a market capitalisation of about R1.06 lakh crore. Tata Oil and Lakmé were divested to Hindustan Lever during this period.
Under his leadership, Tata Steel, which had remained a five-million-tonne producer for nearly a century, expanded rapidly through the acquisitions of NatSteel, Millennium Steel in Thailand and, most significantly, Corus. Tata Motors acquired the iconic Jaguar Land Rover brands. Other acquisitions included Brunner Mond, the UK soda ash and sodium bicarbonate producer, for £370 million.
Ratan Tata initially faced resistance from several powerful company heads who had enjoyed considerable autonomy under JRD. Bringing greater discipline and accountability to the Group, and replacing some of these leaders, consumed considerable time and energy. He also introduced a brand royalty charged to Group companies for using the Tata name, a move that generated considerable resentment among some companies and investors. During his tenure, debt increased at both the operating company level and at Tata Sons. Internal restructuring also took place, including the transfer of the Jojobera power assets in Jharkhand to Tata Steel. Tata Sons also explored acquiring Orient-Express Hotels, offering a premium of around 40 per cent over the prevailing market price in 2012.
His two largest overseas acquisitions attracted criticism as Corus struggled to compete in a changing global steel market. When industry conditions deteriorated, Corus became a significant burden for Tata Steel. Although the acquisition was widely applauded initially, its timing proved unfortunate. Nevertheless, Tata Steel was transformed from a regional producer into the world’s tenth-largest steel company, with a capacity of 25 million tonnes per annum.
The global acquisition strategy also resulted in a substantial build-up of debt at both Tata Sons and several operating companies.
Ratan Tata will be remembered for his outward-looking vision. His principal contribution was to globalise the Tata Group, establish an international footprint and position its companies to compete with the world’s leading businesses on their own turf.
Back to India focus
Cyrus Mistry, who succeeded Ratan Tata in 2012, inherited a Group carrying nearly $37 billion of debt following the overseas acquisitions. A realist by temperament, his first priority was to reduce this debt burden. Several of the global acquisitions were underperforming, while profits generated by Indian businesses were being used to subsidise losses at companies such as Tata Steel and Tata Motors.
Mistry argued that, as global investors were increasingly looking towards India’s expanding market, the Group should refocus on domestic opportunities. He explored exiting Corus (renamed Tata Steel Europe) by selling the UK steelmaking operations while retaining the profitable Netherlands flat-products business. He also wanted Tata Steel to concentrate more on greenfield expansion in India.
His tenure was marked by significant impairment charges against acquisitions made during the Ratan Tata era. In the case of Corus alone, an impairment of Rs8,356 crore was recognised, along with write-downs on other underperforming assets, including Brunner Mond within Tata Chemicals. Several non-performing assets were mothballed or sold. Mistry’s strategy centred on shedding businesses that had been acquired enthusiastically but were no longer generating adequate returns. These included the Boston hotel owned by Indian Hotels Company.
He also consolidated the Group’s portfolio by exiting loss-making businesses. During his tenure, Tata Steel’s Long Products Europe business (the Scunthorpe steelworks and related assets) was sold to Greybull Capital for £1 in 2016. The business employed around 4,000 people.
Mistry also sought to leverage Jaguar Land Rover’s expertise to develop a pipeline of new passenger vehicle models for India. While the Tata Nano had failed to achieve commercial success despite being India’s first indigenously designed and engineered car, Mistry believed a broader product range across multiple price points could help recover lost market share. He placed greater emphasis on safety, comfort and styling, drawing heavily on JLR’s engineering expertise. Plans for an electric SUV were also reportedly developed during his tenure.
However, his management style, including the appointment of his own advisory team, did not sit well with sections of the Tata establishment. He was eventually removed, with Ratan Tata returning as interim chairman until a permanent successor was appointed.
Enter Chandrasekaran
Chandrasekaran was the second non-Tata chairman appointed during Ratan Tata’s second innings. One major difference compared with his two predecessors was that, while both Ratan Tata and Cyrus Mistry were owners, Chandrasekaran was the first professional to assume the highest post in the House of Tata.
The difference between him and Mistry was that, while Mistry was seen as an outsider, Chandrasekaran – or Chandra, as he is known – was an insider who had worked his way up through TCS, serving under FC Kohli and S Ramadorai. He knew TCS, one of the Group’s largest companies by market capitalisation, inside out, along with many of its people over a career spanning nearly four decades.
Unlike Wipro or Infosys, TCS did not pursue many large-ticket acquisitions over the past decade. Its biggest was the $700 million acquisition of Florida-based Coastal Cloud in December 2025, aimed at expanding its Salesforce and AI-driven cloud migration services. During 2015-20, TCS focused instead on selective acquisitions of smaller niche companies. One of its biggest challenges was adapting to AI and meeting the opportunities and challenges arising from it.
During Chandrasekaran’s tenure, Tata Steel undertook a series of acquisitions as several distressed companies came up for sale through the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT). Bhushan Steel, Bhushan Steel & Power and the steel division of Usha Martin were all acquired before Covid. Unlike Ratan Tata, whose focus had been on overseas assets, Chandra concentrated on strengthening the Group’s market position in India. Tata Steel also expanded the capacity of its Odisha plant to 8 million tonnes. He also divested certain assets, including the Group’s 50 per cent stake in Dhamra Port, the deep-draught, all-weather port held jointly with L&T, at an enterprise value of Rs5,500 crore.
While these initiatives were India-focused, Chandrasekaran also oversaw the signing of an MoU with Thyssenkrupp Steel in 2017. The proposal envisaged merging Tata Steel Europe’s flat-products business with Thyssenkrupp Steel. Had the merger gone through, the combined entity, Thyssenkrupp Tata Steel, would have become a dominant force in Europe, with Thyssenkrupp ranked second and Tata Steel Europe third. However, the European Commission blocked the merger on competition grounds. Chandrasekaran also divested some overseas assets, including NatSteel and Tata Steel Thailand (formerly Millennium Steel).
Was Chandra successful in building capacity? Judging by market valuation, it was during his tenure that Tata Steel’s market capitalisation fell below that of JSW Steel for the first time. Tata Steel currently has a market capitalisation of about Rs2.13 lakh crore, compared with JSW Steel’s Rs3.13 lakh crore.
Unlike Ratan Tata or Cyrus Mistry, Chandrasekaran was not a car enthusiast. Nevertheless, during his tenure a number of new models were launched, some of them based on plans developed under Mistry, who had created a strong pipeline for the Indian passenger vehicle market.
The India-focused strategy saw Tata Motors strengthen its manufacturing capacity by acquiring Ford’s Sanand plant in Gujarat, adding capacity for around 300,000 vehicles. A separate electric vehicle business was created with investments from private equity players including TPG and ADQ at a valuation of $9.1 billion. The Tata Nexon SUV became an immediate success and rapidly gained market share thanks to its early lead. Other launches included the Punch and Tiago.
Tata Motors also strengthened its commercial vehicle business by acquiring Iveco’s commercial vehicles business at an estimated value of £3.2 billion, enabling it to expand its presence in the European market. It also acquired full control of Tata Marcopolo Motors, the bus body-building company in which it already held a 51 per cent stake.
During his tenure, Tata Motors was also split into separate passenger vehicle and commercial vehicle companies, a long-overdue restructuring. The combined market capitalisation of the two companies is now close to Rs3 lakh crore.
Beyond the two flagship companies, the wider Tata Group also underwent considerable internal consolidation. Tata Consumer Products acquired food business assets from Tata Chemicals, Tata Power emerged as one of India’s largest green energy companies, and Titan grew into one of the Group’s biggest businesses, with a market capitalisation of about Rs4.50 lakh crore. Most major Tata companies now have market capitalisations exceeding Rs1 lakh crore. Trent, for instance, is valued at around R1.56 lakh crore.
While much can be written about the performance of the Group under each chairman, it is enough to say that each had a distinct leadership style. JRD built consensus before acting; Ratan Tata listened to everyone but ultimately did what he believed was right; Cyrus Mistry unfortunately did not have enough time to execute his vision; while Chandrasekaran brought a professional management mindset. He introduced performance-driven budgeting with less emphasis on command-and-control or consensus-building, preferring numbers over emotion. His biggest criticism, arguably, was his handling of the Air India acquisition and the pace of its subsequent turnaround. The Group’s e-commerce platforms and the acquisitions of BigBasket and 1mg are still incurring losses, as are some of the newer initiatives launched during his tenure, including substantial investments in semiconductor manufacturing.