Cover Feature

A daughter’s right

From TVS to Murugappa and Kalyani, family succession disputes expose the distance between daughters’ legal inheritance rights and economic equality

Lancelot Joseph

The law has changed. Family equations may not have. Daughters have a right to inheritance. Sons have no exclusive claim by birth. Parliament has said so. The Supreme Court has reinforced it. But in India’s family-controlled industrial empires, the law is only the beginning. The real battle may lie in the valuation of assets, the division of wealth and the definition of a fair settlement.

The dispute within the TVS family puts the gap between legal equality and economic reality under the spotlight. It also raises a larger question: when a daughter is given a management position, is she being recognised as an equal owner – or merely being entrusted with a business?

The distinction is critical. A boardroom seat is not a share of family wealth. A title is not an inheritance. And a business arrangement, however carefully documented, may not necessarily settle the economic interests of every member of a family.

Distribution of wealth

The ongoing public disagreement between Venu Srinivasan, his wife Mallika Srinivasan, daughter Lakshmi Venu, and son Sudarshan Venu has brought into sharp focus the distinction between management succession and economic ownership. Their dispute concerns the distribution of wealth and economic interests within a family whose assets and enterprises have grown across generations. It is about whether management is concurrent with ownership. And it is about sons and daughters.

A family divided : (clockwise from top left) Venu Srinivasan, Mallika, Lakshmi and Sudarshan

The dispute also concerns primarily the companies TVS Motor, a firm with a market capitalisation of about Rs2.13 lakh crore (as of Friday, 13 November 2026), Tractors and Farm Equipment (TAFE), the country’s second largest tractor manufacturer and which is unlisted, and Sundaram-Clayton, a die casting business and part of the TVS Group, with a market capitalisation of about Rs2,424 crore.

The TVS Group traces its origins to TV Sundaram Iyengar, who established the business in 1911. His grandson, Venu Srinivasan, later transformed and expanded the family’s automotive interests. Under his leadership, TVS Motor emerged as one of India’s leading two- and three-wheeler manufacturers.

At present, Venu is chairman emeritus at TVS Motor while Sudarshan is the chairman and managing director. Venu is also chairman at Sundaram-Clayton, where Lakshmi is the managing director. Mallika Srinivasan is chairman and managing director at Tractors and Farm Equipment (TAFE), a company started by her grandfather and part of Amalgamation Group.

According to news reports, the family reached an agreement in which Sudarshan would get TVS Motor while Lakshmi would get Sundaram-Clayton and inherit Mallika’s interests in TAFE. This division is now in dispute.

A TVS Holdings stock exchange disclosure, dated 22 March 2024, states that an MoU, dated 10 December 2020, was signed, with implementation taking effect from February 2022. This disclosure describes the larger TVS family settlement, executed by Venu, Mallika, Lakshmi, and Sudarshan. TVS Motor itself was not a party to the agreement.

Venu and Sudarshan view this document as part of a wider family understanding on succession and inheritance. According to them, the family assets had been divided fairly and the arrangements implemented.

Mallika and Lakshmi maintain that it merely deals with business arrangements, brand rights, and related obligations rather than a comprehensive division of family assets. Mallika has also challenged the inclusion of TAFE as part of the family settlement, saying it is not part of the Venu Srinivasan family. Mallika’s maiden family continues to hold shares of the company started by her father, and her own share is limited.

While the full underlying agreement, trust documents, and valuation records are not publicly available, the March 2024 disclosure does list the salient terms of the agreement, principally relating to trademarks, non-compete obligations, and restrictions on specified business activities. However, it does not provide an asset-by-asset valuation or a comprehensive schedule establishing the division of economic ownership within the Venu Srinivasan family.

The exchange disclosure, therefore, establishes the existence and broad nature of the MoU, but does not independently establish whether an equitable economic settlement was completed. That distinction is central to the controversy: a document can record business-control arrangements without necessarily resolving the question of economic ownership.

“The fundamental issue is not about management positions, which have been compensated appropriately and commensurately,” said Mallika and Lakshmi in their joint statement of 12 October. “It is about the fair recognition of rightful economic ownership, which remains unresolved.”

The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, sought to dismantle an unequal inheritance framework. Yet the experience of women in prominent industrial families suggests that legal reform does not automatically translate into economic equality.

BUSINESS BEHIND THE DISPUTE: TVS Motor Rs47,270 crore
Sundaram-Clayton Rs1,789 crore

The TVS family dispute is not a court ruling on a daughter’s inheritance rights. It is a contested family arrangement, with differing public positions on whether an economic settlement has been concluded. That distinction matters. But the questions it raises are larger than the family itself.

The TAFE connection

TAFE has entered the public debate over the TVS succession dispute, with the question of Mallika Srinivasan’s interests in the Amalgamations Group being brought into the discussion of Lakshmi’s economic entitlement.

TAFE belongs to the Amalgamations Group, a separate business group founded by Mallika’s grandfather, S Anantharamakrishnan, and which was grown by her father, A Sivasailam. Mallika is TAFE’s chairman and managing director, while Lakshmi is its vice-chairman. Lakshmi also holds a senior executive position at Sundaram-Clayton.

Mallika and Lakshmi have maintained that TAFE has no bearing on the economic settlement within the Venu Srinivasan family. Mallika is a shareholder in the Amalgamations Group, a separate family business, and her interests there cannot automatically be treated as compensation for any economic entitlement Lakshmi may have in the TVS family. While her share in TAFE is not known, it is reported to be at around 10 per cent or so, while her paternal uncle, A Krishnamoorthy, reportedly holds about 40 per cent. Krishnamoorthy has no children, which means that Mallika’s control of TAFE is unlikely to be challenged.

The distinction between TAFE and TVS is important. An individual’s inherited or independently held interests in one family business cannot simply be counted as a substitute for an unresolved economic settlement in another family. Nor does holding an executive position in a separate business establish that an equitable settlement has been reached elsewhere.

Venu and Sudarshan maintain that the family arrangement took the interests of family members into account. Mallika and Lakshmi say that no transparent, mutually agreed economic settlement was initiated, let alone concluded, within the Venu Srinivasan family.

The fundamental issue is not about management positions... It is about the fair recognition of rightful economic ownership
— Mallika Srinivasan and Lakshmi Venu

The precise valuation, transfer arrangements and liabilities underlying the competing accounts are not available in the public domain. The central question remains: can an inheritance or business interest from one side of a family be counted as compensation for an unresolved economic entitlement in another?

The financial stakes

The scale and structure of the businesses involved give the dispute a significant economic dimension. But comparing company revenues alone cannot establish the value of an individual family member’s inheritance.

TVS Motor reported its highest-ever revenue from operations of Rs47,270.32 crore for FY26, against Rs36,251.32 crore in the previous year, registering a growth of 30 per cent. Operating profit before tax rose 40 per cent to Rs4,975 crore. Operating EBITDA margin improved to 12.9 per cent, while two- and three-wheeler sales, including international business, reached 58.89 lakh units. These figures are confirmed by the company’s 13 May 2026 financial announcement and audited results.

Sundaram-Clayton Limited, meanwhile, reported standalone revenue from operations of Rs1,788.55 crore in FY26, against Rs2,109.14 crore in the preceding year.

Its profit before depreciation, finance costs, exceptional items and tax was Rs330.29 crore, compared with Rs297.16 crore in FY25. Profit before exceptional items and tax stood at Rs113.34 crore. The company reported exceptional items of Rs513.49 crore, taking profit before tax to Rs626.83 crore and net profit to Rs552.23 crore.

An important qualification is necessary here. The exceptional gain of Rs513.49 crore arose from the transfer of a land parcel at Padi, Chennai, and should not be confused with the earlier divestment of the Hosur manufacturing business.

The ongoing public disagreement has brought into sharp focus the distinction between management succession and economic ownership
Equality must be the cornerstone of a fair settlement
Mallika Srinivasan

Sundaram-Clayton’s Hosur high-pressure and low-pressure aluminium die-casting businesses were transferred to Sandhar Ascast Private Limited in March 2025 for Rs163 crore. The divestment makes the FY26 and FY25 revenue figures less directly comparable.

The corporate structure also requires clarification. The original Sundaram-Clayton Limited was renamed TVS Holdings Limited in July 2023. Its manufacturing business was demerged into Sundaram-Clayton DCD Limited, which subsequently became the present Sundaram-Clayton Limited. TVS Holdings is now a key holding entity, owning 50.26 per cent of TVS Motor. Its ownership structure is distinct from that of the manufacturing company.

The differently sized businesses underline why family settlements can become complicated. Revenue, operating profit, market capitalisation, promoter shareholding and personal economic entitlement are different measures. The value of a listed company cannot be equated with the value of a family member’s stake, nor can business performance automatically determine an inheritance claim.

The financial contrast nevertheless raises an important question: when family assets and business interests are divided, what valuation date is used, which assets are included, and how are the respective economic interests calculated? Can complexity be reason enough to extinguish one child’s ownership rights?

Mallika’s position is clear: “Equality must be the cornerstone of a fair settlement.”

The statement carries a significance beyond that of a senior business leader asserting her economic rights. Mallika is also a mother standing up for her daughter’s place in the family’s wealth. Her argument goes to the heart of the inheritance debate: a woman’s economic rights cannot be measured merely by the management responsibilities she holds, but by whether her ownership interests are recognised on an equal footing.

Lakshmi Venu has held senior positions in the group’s businesses. But a management role and a share of family wealth are two different entitlements. One may be earned through professional competence; the other may arise through ownership, succession or family arrangements. The TVS dispute exposes the difficulty of separating the two when a family’s business and personal wealth are intertwined.

What the law says

The legal position is clear on a daughter’s coparcenary rights, though its application to business wealth can be complex. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956, governs succession among Hindus, Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs, subject to its provisions and exceptions. The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, amended Section 6 to recognise daughters as coparceners by birth in Mitakshara joint-family property, with the same rights and liabilities as sons.

The reform was not a sudden national intervention. Andhra Pradesh, under Chief Minister N. T. Rama Rao, took an early legislative step in 1986, with the amendment deemed effective from 5 September 1985. Tamil Nadu followed in 1989, while Maharashtra and Karnataka enacted similar reforms in 1994. Parliament eventually extended the principle nationally in 2005.

NTR’s intervention is a reminder that the demand for inheritance equality was not a recent corporate-family controversy. It has been a long-standing social and legal struggle.

NTR’s intervention is a reminder that the demand for inheritance equality was not a recent corporate-family controversy. It has been a long-standing social and legal struggle

In 2020, the Supreme Court’s judgment in Vineeta Sharma vs Rakesh Sharma clarified that a daughter’s coparcenary right is by birth and does not depend on whether her father was alive when the 2005 amendment came into force. The daughter is a coparcener in her own right – not a secondary claimant.

But the amendment does not turn every asset owned by a parent or business group into joint-family property. Wills, trusts, individual shareholdings and valid family settlements may raise different legal questions.

That distinction becomes especially consequential in family-controlled companies. Ownership may be held through shares, trusts, holding companies and cross-shareholdings, while management is assigned through board and corporate processes. A daughter may lead a business without holding an equivalent economic interest; equally, an heir may have an ownership claim without an executive role.

The law establishes rights. It does not, by itself, determine the valuation of a family enterprise, design an equitable settlement or ensure that every heir has the information needed to assess an ownership interest. That is where the gap between legal equality and economic reality emerges.

The governance risk

Prolonged uncertainty over who ultimately owns and controls a promoter stake can become a governance risk for listed companies and their minority shareholders, even when management succession is already in place.

That is the issue InGovern Research Services examines in its November 2026 report, When Family Succession Disputes Become a Listed-Company Governance Risk – Lessons from the TVS Succession Matter.

The report argues that subsequent changes in business valuations should not, by themselves, be grounds for reopening a documented family settlement. Differences should be resolved through the relevant agreements and applicable legal processes, without disrupting the management or operations of listed companies.

InGovern has, however, clarified that it is not adjudicating the competing claims. It has not examined the confidential MoU, trust deeds, private correspondence or valuation documents. Its report therefore cannot be treated as an independent finding that an equitable economic settlement was completed.

The advisory firm has called for a review of disclosures by TVS Holdings and TVS Motor, particularly if the dispute has implications for promoter ownership, control, board composition or succession arrangements.

It has also pointed out that the formalisation of management roles through corporate processes does not, by itself, establish that all economic entitlements under the broader family arrangement have been settled.

The issue has moved closer to the courtroom. Eight caveats were filed by family members on 12 and 13 October 2026, in Chennai’s City Civil Court and Commercial Court, four in each court.

A caveat is a precautionary filing intended to ensure that the person filing it is heard before a court passes an order on an anticipated application affecting their interests. It is not itself a substantive lawsuit or a judicial finding on the dispute.

The filings indicate that family members are preparing to protect their respective positions should the matter come before the courts. They do not establish that a formal inheritance suit has been decided or that either side has prevailed.

Mallika and Lakshmi have also challenged the suggestion that all family assets belonged exclusively to one individual, who could distribute them unilaterally. They described this as “neither an agreed nor an established position”, insisting that any equitable settlement must be based on transparent valuation, discussion and mutual consent.

Their clarification was categorical: “Management responsibilities must not be confused with economic ownership.” They said leadership positions, opportunities to manage businesses and arrangements involving trademarks, brand usage and non-compete obligations could not be presented as a division of family assets or a substitute for rightful economic interests.

A spokesperson for Mallika Srinivasan and Lakshmi Venu said the two remain keen on an amicable resolution through transparent discussions and constructive dialogue, in the best interests of the family, its businesses and all stakeholders.

InGovern also cautions against using subsequent business performance either to validate a private succession arrangement or to reopen it. Any dispute over succession agreements and their meaning must be assessed against their terms and applicable law. Lakshmi’s position turns on the prior question of whether the family ever reached an economic settlement in the first place.

The wider lesson is that family-controlled listed companies need robust documentation, timely disclosure and a transparent resolution mechanism. These are not merely housekeeping measures. They can help protect the company, the family and its investors from succession uncertainty.

Venu and the Tata question

There is another interesting dimension to Venu Srinivasan’s growing prominence in India’s corporate governance debates. Venu is a Tata Trusts trustee and a non-executive director of Tata Sons. He was one of the two Tata Trusts nominee directors on the Tata Sons board during the September 2026 dispute over the proposed reappointment of N Chandrasekaran as executive chairman.

Any dispute over succession agreements and their meaning must be assessed against their terms and applicable law. Lakshmi’s position turns on the prior question of whether the family ever reached an economic settlement in the first place.

At the September 17 board meeting, Venu supported Chandrasekaran’s reappointment for another five years, while Tata Trusts chairman Noel Tata opposed it. The Tata Sons board approved the reappointment by majority vote. Tata Trusts subsequently challenged the validity of the decision, arguing that its Articles of Association required affirmative support from a majority of its nominee directors. With its two nominees voting differently, the Trusts maintained that this condition had not been met. Tata Sons, however, maintained that the board decision was valid.

The differences widened further. On 30 September, Venu and fellow Sir Dorabji Tata Trust (SDTT) vice-chairman Vijay Singh objected to a 28 September communication from Tata Trusts to the Tata Sons board proposing a strategic restructuring involving the merger of Tata Electronics Systems Solutions and Tata Consulting Engineers with Tata Sons. In a letter to fellow trustees, they said no SDTT trustees’ meeting had authorised the proposal and that the trustees had not been consulted before the communication was sent. They questioned whether the proposal could be presented as the collective position of the Trusts without proper deliberation.

On 5 October, four other SDTT trustees, including Noel Tata, accused Venu and Singh of departing from the Trusts’ long-standing position against listing Tata Sons. They maintained that the restructuring proposal was consistent with earlier decisions to keep the holding company privately held. The available reporting establishes Venu’s participation in this governance dispute. It does not establish that he has formally been appointed as a mediator to settle differences between Tata Trusts and Tata Sons.

The Murugappa dispute was settled in 2023 through a family arrangement

Nevertheless, the parallel invites an uncomfortable question. Before being looked upon as an interlocutor in resolving differences within another prominent business family, should Venu not first put his own house in order?

The economic settlement question within his own family remains publicly contested, with Mallika and Lakshmi insisting that no transparent, mutually agreed division of economic interests has taken place. The point is not whether Venu has the stature or experience to contribute to corporate governance debates elsewhere. It is whether the principles of transparency, mutual consent and equitable economic ownership being debated in the Tata context are equally reflected in the resolution of his own family differences. The irony is difficult to overlook. Family-business governance cannot be advocated selectively.

The Murugappa story

The Murugappa family dispute offered an earlier example of a daughter challenging the traditional exclusion of women from the governance structures of a family business.

Valli Arunachalam, daughter of the late MV Murugappan, sought a board position at Ambadi Investments, the holding company of the Murugappa Group, or fair compensation for her family branch’s shareholding of about 8.23 per cent. The dispute also involved her mother, MV Valli Murugappan, and sister Vellachi. Legal proceedings were initiated before the National Company Law Tribunal in 2020. Valli had publicly raised concerns about patriarchal norms that kept women out of the holding company’s board.

The dispute was settled in 2023 through a family arrangement. The terms remained confidential. The family said the arrangement would resolve the differences and that necessary transactions would follow.

The Murugappa dispute was not, strictly speaking, a battle over whether a daughter was entitled to inherit. Valli Arunachalam, her sister and their mother had already inherited a stake in Ambadi Investments from her late father, MV Murugappan. The conflict was over what that inheritance meant in practice: whether the family branch could secure representation on the company’s board or obtain fair financial compensation for its shareholding.

Inheritance establishes ownership; it does not necessarily confer management control or a board seat. Yet a shareholding that carries economic value but offers little influence over a closely held family enterprise can leave an heir with rights on paper and limited power in practice. The family reached a settlement in 2023, ending the protracted legal battle. Its confidential terms have not established publicly whether the resolution secured board representation, financial parity or a negotiated exit.

The confidentiality of the settlement leaves the precise outcome unavailable for public scrutiny. That is common in family arrangements. Yet the absence of transparency can also make it difficult to assess whether a settlement reflects equality or merely ends the dispute.

Sugandha Hiremath, sister of Baba Kalyani, has pursued a legal dispute concerning an alleged family arrangement of 1994

Kalyani: A family arrangement under scrutiny

A family arrangement can settle a dispute – or become the subject of another legal battle. Sugandha Hiremath, sister of Bharat Forge chairman Baba Kalyani, has pursued a legal dispute concerning an alleged family arrangement of 1994. Her suit before the Bombay High Court sought enforcement of the alleged arrangement. The claims remain contested and have not been finally adjudicated. The Bombay High Court declined to compel mediation in May 2026, holding that it could not force parties into a voluntary settlement when one side was unwilling.

The matter subsequently moved to the Supreme Court. An order dated 31 August 2026 recorded that mediation proceedings were pending and permitted parties to seek deferment of hearings in related proceedings. A 9 September Bombay High Court order consequently adjourned a related third-party application to 25 November 2026, pending completion of mediation.

The case underscores a crucial distinction. Inheritance entitlement, testamentary freedom and enforcement of a family arrangement are different legal questions. A family arrangement must be assessed on its terms, the rights of the parties and the applicable law.

The Kalyani dispute demonstrates how even an agreement dating back decades can become a source of conflict when its terms, implementation or interpretation are contested.